



Australian  
National  
University



---

ANU CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES

## **ANU Centre for European Studies Briefing Paper Series**

**The EU's and Greece's Approach to Unregulated Migration:  
Disparity and its Impact on the Stability of the European Union Liberal Order**

Constantine Karouzos



**Vol.12 no.2 (August 2021)**  
**ISSN 1838-0379**

## Recent Briefing Papers

### **The ANU Centre for European Studies Briefing Paper Series**

is an interdisciplinary series that aims to provide a concise overview of the latest research promoting greater understanding of issues relating to Europe, the European Union and the Europe– Australia relationship.

The Papers serve as a summary of these issues, and as a ready information source for the preparation of submissions, media releases or reports for use by university students, government departments, diplomats and other interested parties, as well as the general public.

The Briefing Papers also showcase the work of the Centre, providing an avenue of public outreach for the broad range of workshops, seminars,

*Identifying Opportunities in EU-Australia Trade in Services* | Steve Nirlich & Sihui Ong | November 2019 | Volume 10 Number 3

*Schuman Lecture Series – Europe at the crossroads: global power or also-ran?* | Gareth Evans | October 2019 | Volume 10 Number 2

*Russian Energy Policy: pivot to the East? Implications for Australia* | Elizabeth Buchanan | October 2019 | Volume 10 Number 1

*Jean Monnet Paper – Understanding the real-world impact of GIs: A critical review of the empirical economic literature* | Áron Török and Hazel V J Moir | July 2018 | Volume 9 Number 3

*Ukraine, Russia and the Future of Europe* | John Besemeres | July 2018 | Volume 9 Number 2

*The European Union and Infectious Diseases: Explanations for Policy and Legal Reform* | Nicholas Simoes da Silva | January 2018 | Volume 8 Number 5

*Is the Australian Offshore Processing System a Model for Europe?* | Camilla Ioli | November 2017 | Volume 8 Number 4

*Schuman Lecture Series – Schuman's Vision in the Age of Disarray: Whither Europe and the West?* | David Ritchie AO | August 2017 | Volume 8 Number 3

*Poland and the New World Disorder* | John Besemeres | July 2017 | Volume 8 Number 2

*ANUCES/ABC's Big Ideas – Exploring Brexit* | January 2017 | Volume 8 Number 1

*Preparatory Approaches to Overcoming Regulatory NTBs in an EU– Australia FTA* |

## Table of Contents

<b>Executive Summary.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Acknowledgements.....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Chapter 1: The European Union’s Policy Response to Migration .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Chapter 2: Greece’s Political &amp; Policy Response to Migration .....</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Chapter 3: The Disparity Between Greece and the EU Policy Response to Compounding Crises</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Chapter 4: Implications, Recommendations &amp; Conclusion .....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>EU References.....</b>	<b>26</b>

## Executive Summary

Greece is currently faced with a growing refugee crisis. As the number of incoming migrants grows, greater challenges amass onto Greece's social, economic and political infrastructure. As a key state on the external EU border, to compound the crisis there is a clear lack of political and policy cohesion between the Greek state response and the broader political and policy position of the European Union (EU). The disparity between the Greek and EU policy response creates a clear problem; the vindication of unregulated migrants' doubles as a vindication of the EU's ability to manage crises and member-state political pressure. The Greek financial and refugee crises have greatly exacerbated the disparity in a coherent EU policy response to unregulated migration. As such, the more political and social pressure the EU comes under for inefficiently responding to migration issues, the likelihood of enticing radical political parties to both dehumanise and politicise the crises while simultaneously undermining the EU and the liberal order.

## Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my gratitude to my supervisor Kasia Williams and Director of ANUCES Anne McNaughton for their invaluable advice and support for the duration of my internship and the time I wrote this research project. We navigated our way through unprecedented times during my placement and without their support it would not have been possible to achieve this completed product. Also, to my whole support network who gave me the motivation to pursue this topic and project.

This Briefing Paper is result of my research project undertaken under the Jean Monnet Network "[The Policy, Politics, Culture: EU Migration and Integration](#)" (PPCEUMI) during my internship at the ANU Centre for European Studies.

With the support of the  
Erasmus+ Programme  
of the European Union



## **Introduction**

The aim of this report is to highlight and analyse the growing and alarming concern of a large disparity in EU and Greek migration policy. To comprehend this policy gap, the report will utilise a top-down approach to this issue, beginning with chapter one identifying key EU policies and regulations on migration. This normative foundation will build the ideal image of what the EU wishes to achieve in regard to unregulated migration. The next chapter will focus on critically analysing major Greek migration policy and legislation since the 1990s in order to examine the influence of these policies in Greece.

Following this, a comprehensive comparative examination to identify critical policy dissonance between state-based policy and interests and the broader EU position. This dissonance creates favourable conditions for both radical left-wing and right-wing, populist governments to employ politicise migration issues as a political tactic that simultaneously isolates and undermines the credibility of the EU and the liberal order in Europe. This will be demonstrated by analysing the effect of compounding financial and humanitarian crises on Greece.

What will emerge is a clear disparity in the Greek-EU policy response to managing crises and the clash of political rhetoric at the time. This report will argue that these conditions arise when a state chooses to pursue a position of Euroscepticism and the de-Europeanisation of their migration policy. After this analysis, this report will identify significant implications and seek to offer recommendations for possible reform and/or reinforcement of key structural policies/procedures in Greece and the EU. These will be aimed at strengthening the Greek and EU response to mass unregulated migration, and more broadly the credibility and legitimacy of the EU-led liberal order.

### **Chapter 1: The European Union's Policy Response to Migration**

The aim of this section is to identify the key policies in EU migration policy and to understand the expected outcomes of each policy. In doing so, a comprehensive image of the EU response to migration can be established to contrast with the domestic policy of Greece. As a matter of presenting a coherent image of EU policy, this section will include the most important policies on migration, those that best compliments Greece's own situation.

#### **The European Union**

In accordance with the EU publication on the institutional arrangements of Europe, the European Union is at its core, a collection of 27 independent sovereign states that have 'pooled' elements of their sovereignty in order to gain 'strength and the benefits of size' (European Union, 2012). Member-states, by pooling their sovereignty, delegate aspects of

their decision-making process to the shared institutions they have created and ratified so that matters of unambiguous joint-interest to Europe can be attended to and addressed democratically; it is a willing unification of independent states and an overarching institutional arrangement that creates an intergovernmental system similar to the UN, and a fully-federal system much like the United States (European Union, 2012).

The institutional framework of the EU is both large and convoluted with an array of treaties, frameworks, regulations, directives and various forms of official rules, procedures and processes that bind and govern the behaviour of member states by European law. In respect to the EU position on unregulated migration, asylum and immigration, the essential regulations and policies can be found across multiple EU treaties as well as within dedicated efforts to addressing issues arising from the mass movement of people. The EU utilises a top-down approach to policymaking, setting out broad goals and aims in large treaties, then systematically introducing various legal instruments to fulfil these aims.

At the core of EU policy instruments is the EU directive. A directive is a legislative act that sets out a goal all EU countries must achieve, but discretion on achieving these directives lies with the individual country to create their own laws to reach these goals (European Union, 2020). Each directive contains a deadline by which EU states must incorporate the directive into national legislation and inform the Commission to that effect (European Commission, 2020). In a similar manner to directives, EU regulations and decisions automatically become binding policies the day they come into force, and national authorities must ensure they are correctly applied. (European Commission, 2020). EU directives and regulations cover a vast amount of policy in areas critical to maintaining European values and goals. Directives cultivate a policy dichotomy. Allowing states to self-legislate to achieve an EU policy outcome is vital to understanding the inner machineries that allow the Union to function as a community of sovereign states. EU directives and regulations derive from a multitude of European institutions and represent broader European ideals captured within various binding treaties, regulations and frameworks. EU goals and aims outlined in treaties are achieved via directives implemented through the legal channel.

There exists a large amount of EU directives concerning unregulated migration, refugees and asylum seekers. Additionally, these directives exemplify the broader European political project, the foundational treaties and regulations which emphasise both equitable human rights and democratic practises, as well as more nuanced EU frameworks, systems and agendas relating to unregulated migration. The large EU treaties creates an idealistic standard of achieving peace and stability, one certainly worthy of ascertaining. The goals in these treaties are then translated into forming different approaches to managing issues pertaining to migration.

The EU's normative foundation is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, a central tenet reflecting the core neo-liberal, Western and democratic approach to facilitating European cooperation on the basis of respecting human rights. The Charter's preamble reflects this dedication stating that the Union 'is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity' grounded in the principles of democracy and rule of law (Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2012). Under article 18, the right to asylum, the Charter recognises and guarantees the respect of the rules laid out in the 1951 Refugee Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees also in accordance with the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Under Title V of the TEU, the Union shall 'define and pursue common policies... in order to safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity' in addition to preserving 'peace, prevent conflict and strengthen international security' (Treaty of the European Union, 2012). A crucial element to the success of the Charter and the TEU is the focus on multilateral cooperation and good governance as a mechanism for facilitating equitable human rights and democratic processes to guide states in upholding the European political project.

The important features of the Charter and the TEU are not directly related per se to the regulation and pursuit of a solution on the issue of unregulated migration. They extensively refer to the human rights, democratic processes, and political association that enhances the unification of the Union. The legislative rhetoric employed within the TEU and Charter indicates the strong European commitment to normative values and shared responsibility to upholding Western, neo-liberal values of human dignity and freedom; as well as the ability to access these rights. Although the Charter and TEU make small mention to migration, the normative strength of these treaties creates the foundation for subsequent EU responses to unregulated migration.

### **Common European Asylum System**

The most complete formulation of the EU's policy response to unregulated migration begins with the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Finalised in 2013, the CEAS draws influence heavily from the 1951 Geneva Convention, where the right to asylum is a fundamental right. The CEAS lays out the conditions of claiming asylum as well as the responsibilities of EU member states. The CEAS consists of five directives:

1. Asylum Procedure Directive – asylum seekers must have access to fair and efficient procedures;
2. Reception Conditions Directive – while waiting for a decision on an application, an asylum seeker is guaranteed a dignified standard of living;
3. Qualification Directive – before asylum is received, he/she must be recognised as a refugee or subsidiary of protection;

4. Eurodac Regulation – A fingerprint system that allows EU member states to determine responsibility for examining an asylum application by comparing fingerprint datasets, and;
5. The Dublin Regulation (European Commission CEAS, 2014).

The CEAS and the five directives form the most coherent formulation of a consistent response to unregulated migration on the EU external borders. By establishing coherent policy practice, and providing the necessary mandates to fulfil it, European agencies like the CEAS attempt to balance and exchange information and actions are efficiently coordinated (European Commission CEAS, 2014). The CEAS continues the European tradition of a normative conceptualisation of the appropriate course of action in processing asylum seekers and other unregulated migrants and is the EU's attempt at a comprehensive framework to addressing unregulated migration.

The Dublin Regulation, although one of the central directives of the CEAS, is a key regulation referring to unregulated migration and is closely related to many pressures facing Member States of the EU. Its core principle is that the responsibility for examining claims lies 'primarily with the Member State which played the greatest part in the applicants' entry or residence in the EU' (European Commission CEAS, 2014). The latest reform of the Dublin Regulation, currently in its fourth stage (Dublin IV), aims to improve cooperation between Member States in burden-sharing and providing a mechanism in to alleviate disproportionate pressure between states (European Commission, 2016). Although now a part of the CEAS, the Dublin regulation is a central component to conceptually understanding the burden states who double as the first point of entry of the EU external border. In tangent with the directives outlined in the CEAS, the Dublin Regulation is critical to humanitarian crises and the copious amounts of pressure states are placed under due to having the sole responsibility of managing asylum applications.

## **Chapter 2: Greece's Political & Policy Response to Migration**

### Context & Background

To understand the existing policy setting in Greece, particularly in contrast to the EU's position, a recount of preceding policies and legislation conveys valuable context on the historical underpinnings of contemporary Greek policy. Mass migration is a phenomenon that requires public policy to be employed and executed in an all-inclusive manner to address the issue at the local and national levels. Furthermore, public policy shaping migration issues must be strategic in the aim of avoiding a limited and fragmented response to the phenomenon that can exacerbate the social, economic and political parameters of migration (Robolis, 2009).



As an external border country of the broader EU, Greece is a historic 'gateway' into mainland Europe. As the migration phenomenon emerged in Greece at the beginning of the 1990s, the state lacked any legislative framework for control and management of immigration (Triandafyllidou, 2009). The collapse of the Albanian communist regime in 1991 and other major geopolitical changes in the region resulted in an unprecedented influx of migrants into Greece.

At this time mounting migratory pressure placed on the Greek conservative government of the 1990s forced the initiative and the government set in motion a policy process that culminated in the *Immigration Law 1975/1991*, the legislative foundation of contemporary migration policy in Greece. The law, titled 'Entry-exit, sojourn, employment deportation of aliens, procedure for the recognition of alien refugees and other provisions' was wholly concerned with implementing restrictions on migration and aimed at preventing the entrance of undocumented migrants and expediting the expulsion of those already in Greek territory (Triandafyllidou, 2009). In addition, greater powers of autonomy were granted to the police force and judicial authorities in exercising control over unregulated migrants.

*Law 1975/1991* does not include any regularisation or integration policies that would create favourable conditions for migrants to be assimilated into the social, economic and cultural structure of Greek life, but rather focuses on state-power and control. The first Greek regularisation programme was only adopted in 1997 after two presidential decrees 358/1997 and 359/1997, six years after 1975/1991 was passed, when approximately 90% of the 700,000 immigrants working/living in Greece at the time were irregular (Apostolatou, 2006).

The predominant influence of Law 1975/1991 in Greece policy does not view legalisation/regularisation as an end-goal in context of meeting broader strategies of humanisms or respecting fundamental rights, but rather to use legalisation as an arbitrary means to control and manage migratory flows (Kapsalis, 2018). This trend can be identified in the proceeding major migration legislation implemented in Greece.

The next essential addition to Greek migration policy came in 2001, with the drafting of *Immigration Law 2910/2001* by Costas Simitis' Socialist government, titled 'Entry and residence of aliens on Greek territory. Acquisition of Greek citizenship by naturalisation and other provisions' (Apostolatou, 2006). The main aim of the policy was to formulate a suitable framework for long-term migrant inclusivity that could compliment Greece's own requirements, but also mirror the policies implemented by other EU-member states (Apostolatou, 2006). The law included more comprehensive management controls of migration, including border control, issue and renewal of stay and work permits and issues pertaining to naturalisation (Triandafylliou, 2008). *2910/2001* did not however produce the intended results. The law placed a heavy emphasis on using migration flows to satisfy certain elements of the informal Greek labour market and manage what was becoming a concerning

issue of mass unregulated migration. This legislative approach undercut itself by strenuously focusing on the short-term economic benefits by exploiting a dispensable labour force via restricting legal migration channels (Mavrodi, 2005). Within the framework of *2910/2001* irregular migrants had the opportunity to rectify and gain regular status under a second regularisation programme drafted in the legislation, provided a prospect migrant could show proof of residence for at least a year (prior to the implementation of the law) and were granted a 6 month period to submit the required documents for a work permit that was the precondition for a residency permit (Kasimis & Kassimi, 2004).

However, the large underground economy and existing restrictive immigration laws inevitably perpetrated a large population of irregular migrants to enter Greece. On paper, the 2001 regularisation programme had been set up for success, but was severely weakened by poor organisation, insufficient data, lack of government oversight, lack of measures to control illegal employment of irregular migrants and lack of measures to control immigration flows (Greenway, 2007). A potential cause for this is the government's emphasis on utilising the presence of illegal migrants in the country as a mechanism to bolstering the national economy, via an arbitrary selection criterion and an unfair portion of accountability placed on migrants to find legal work streams and produce official documents under an institutionalised structure already functioning at the detriment to the prospects of migrants. This can be attributed to Greece's traditional reactive approach to irregular migration, informal employment and devoted approach to maximising immigrants' impact on the labour force (Triandafyllidou, 2013).

The purpose of identifying and analysing the broader impacts of past migration laws and policies is to build a contextual foundation to explain policy today. The significant analytical conclusion derived from *Law 1975/1991* and *Law 2910/2001* and the associated regularisation programmes is that the traditional Greek political ideology regarding immigration is inherently state-based and anti-inclusive. The initial formation of contemporary migration law and legalities was exclusive, with a strong focus on using migrant labour so long as it benefitted the state.

The first-time Greek experience of immigration (i.e. host country), as opposed to its historical trends of emigration (i.e. country of origin), is weaved into the Greek immigration policy-setting defined by nationalistic-induced arrests, deportations and an obsessive approach to transforming incoming migrants into reinforced pillars of the labour force and informal economy. Present-day migration policy in Greece is inherently a reflection of the initial policy response.

Both *Law 1975/1991* and *Law 2910/2001*, and the related regularisation programmes demonstrate a lack of experience, alongside political will, in producing an inclusive legal framework of unregulated and prospect migrants. The government also struggled in

producing effective instruments to implement and enforce these policies at the ground level. The next major policy to be passed on migration sought to increase the overall response to unregulated migrants and simultaneously incorporate more 'European' directives. *Law 3386/2005*, titled 'concerning the Entry, Residence, and Social Integration of citizens of foreign countries', was drafted with the aim of updating migration legislation with a more integrative response. Nearly half of the articles adopted refer to the transposition of EU directives, most notably long-term resident status (*2003/109*) and family reunification (*2003/86*) directives (Triandafyllidou, 2009). This law also introduced a new regularisation programme, the third of its kind in less than a decade.

A key amendment, *Law 3536/2007*, was added to *3386/2005* in 2007 due to more political inefficiencies and shortcoming relating to the overall processing of applications for new entries or renewals of work permits that was aimed at simplifying procedures (Triandafyllidou, 2008). Also included was the fourth and final significant regularisation programme that allowed migrants who could not renew their work permits under *3386/2005* and could not claim insurance stamps.

Despite these numerous attempts to legislate and reform migration law in Greece, the state has incrementally failed at comprehensively answering, or rather the ability to compensate for the future, the issue of unregulated migration. The aforementioned policies indicate two significant findings. Firstly, Greece's migration policy setting is fraught with short-sighted reactive approaches. Secondly, it lacks political commitment to endorsing an inclusive migration policy framework that is not intended to either be exploited to boost specific areas of the Greek economy or preserve the ethno-national identity of the state. *Law 1975/1991* granted excessive power to control, arrest and deport. *2910/2001* sought to exploit prospective migrants to reinforce the state's informal labour force and economy.

There also exist numerous legal instruments that operate at the detriment of migrant rights outside of the four key laws already discussed. In Section II of the Greek constitution, relating to Individual and Social Rights of all individuals living in Greece, eight of the eighteen articles stipulate that the exercising of a right pertain *only* to Greek citizens; eliminating the right of immigrants (who are legal residents) to rally (article 11) and or to enter into associations (article 12) (Gropas & Triandafyllidou, 2005). There is also a heavy sentiment of preferential policy implementation by distinguishing between (and giving preferential treatment to) immigrants of Greek-ethnic origin and the 'others' (Gropas & Triandafyllidou, 2005).

### **2007-2016: Europeanising Policy**

Due to Greece's lack of a cohesive immigration policy since the 1990s an absence of awareness in regard to recognising migrants' rights increased. Whether or not it can be labelled a purposeful lack of political will and management, an increase of pressure in 2007,

due to the increased inflow of migrants on the Greek sea/land border prompted Greek policymakers to increasingly adopt EU directives into the legal framework of immigration. European influence is observable through the laws *2910/2001* and *3386/2005*. Greek policymakers, although demonstrating an apathetic position on the issue, understood the importance of co-signing a position of solidarity with acting 'European' and adopting EU directives more systematically into the legislative framework for immigration.

This form of political evolution to conceptually align more closely with the values and beliefs of acting 'European' is a process of Europeanising, or Europeanisation. A state's experience in Europeanisation can significantly differ. The normative expectation of Europeanisation is the full integration, adoption and purposeful implementation of the European model and values by the political elites (Ioakimidis, 2000). Europeanisation is a proactive approach to the modernisation of ideology. This process, if able to occur at the policy level, creates an ideological shift within a political system. Internalising EU practices and conventions into policy and the political structure acts as a catalyst for the evolution of policy to align with EU policies, regulations, directives and practices. As a result, Europeanisation penetrates national and sub-national levels of governance through practical policy implementation, the exportation of alien forms of political governance relative to the normative practice of the EU and the continuous commitment to the broader political project of a unified and strong Europe (Stavridis, 2003).

The European Commission also confirms Europeanisation influences on Greek migration policy. The Commission published a factsheet alongside the European Migration Network (EMN) organising Greek migration policy, stating that that asylum policies and procedures are regulated by international conventions and the legal framework also includes EU regulations and an assortment of Presidential decrees transposing EU directives; parallel to Law *3907/2011* on the Establishment of an Asylum Service and a First Reception Service, but also importantly transposing into Greek legislation EU Directive *2008/115/EU* on 'common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (European Commission & EMN, 2012).

Indeed, European conventions and directives are located throughout Greek policy in relation to unregulated migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. *3386/2005* is still the predominant legislation in regard to immigration but has also been amended numerous times to improve the implementation of procedures & services established in Law *4018/2011*, concerning the restructuring of the residence permit for foreigners under increased security conditions (European Commission & EMN, 2012). Presidential Decree *114/2010* defines minimum standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status according to Directive *2005/85/EC* (2005), which was introduced to a 'minimum framework' on for granting and withdrawing refugee status, confirming the presence of EU legislation interwoven into Greek policy.

This is clear policy-based evidence of the existence of (at least a 'soft') process of Europeanisation occurring in regard to Greek migration policy. Evidence of Europeanising Greek migration policy started with the drafting of 2910/2001, which incorporates an array of EU directives into the policy. Yet, advocating for stronger European influences begun with the election of the PASOK Socialist party to government in 2009. The central aim of the party was to modernise Greek citizenship requirements and the party ushered in a key policy, *Citizenship Law 3838/2010* on the 'citizenship and naturalisation' of unregulated migrants to more closely conform to 'European' conceptualisations of individual rights and the integration processes of third-party nationals. This policy aligned more closely with the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and modernised Greek immigration policy into a vastly more inclusive and progressive citizenship process that granted full political rights for foreign residents who have lived legally in Greece for five years and lowered the naturalisation requirement from 10 years to 7 years. Ioannis Diamantidis, the former spokesperson for the Socialist majority, stated in parliament during a debate on the policy that:

*'it is not possible that we want simply and only cheap third-world labour force... ignoring the consequences on Greek workers... ignoring also the human rights, the European practice and our obligations as a modern organised polity.'* (Triandafyllidou, 2014).

By accentuating adherence to the 'European' practice, the Socialist party was attempting to harmonise a critical area of national sovereignty, citizenship, with the European discourse of a modern, well-governed state. The aim was to be consistent with the EU human rights tradition and to interweave the pre-conceived normative expectations of the Union into an exclusive national policy (Triandafyllidou, 2014). Aligning national policy closer to the normative expectation of the EU serves as a mechanism of re-establishing a discourse of identity in Greece – more democratic, transparent and legally efficient which converge to generate the positive attributes associated with being 'European'. This creates an indirect effect of Europeanisation via Greek socialists supporting a more open inclusive definition of Greek citizenship. Of course, there is no explicit mention of 'Europeanising' Greece or Greek policy, but it's a focussed attempt at portraying possibilities for Greece to act *more* European, or at least what is normatively accepted behaviour of a European state.

This soft process of Europeanisation in Greek migration policy has alleviated many issues stemming from Greece's lack of a coherent migration policy before the 1990. The European influence has indeed mitigated some of the discriminatory elements that were present since the implementation of Law 1975/1991 and subsequent policies. Greece has traditionally been slow to apply EU rules when forced to, as tardily as possible, and without a comprehensive plan to provide further rights to unregulated migrants or source a policy-based solution to systematically address arising issues (Papageorgiou, 2013). EU Policy implementation

attempts still yet exist as a mechanism of facilitating European support which Greece has been in grave need of by further aligning national policies with EU frameworks and conventions.

The President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen has glorified Greece's borders as that of Europe as well, offering gratitude to Greece for 'being our European *aspida* (shield)' (Euronews, 2020). If Greece is the shield of Europe, do policy channels reflect this cohesion? At least in the domestic setting, EU policies are closely interwoven into the Greek political system, which at the very least, denotes a solidarity between the Union and Greece at the policy level. It is important for the EU to support Greece due to its important geopolitical location as a border state of Europe. A more 'European' Greece is a strong ethical and strategic bolster as the 'shield' of the Union in Eastern Europe. However, the legacy of European identity discourse does not stem merely from verbal support or entwining EU regulations within Greek national policy. An important question arises. Greece migration policy as demonstrated, has lacked a thorough solution to amassing inflows of migrants and an absence of adhering to principles of a modernised Europe. Even with a large amount of EU legislation interwoven into the domestic policy-setting, Greek identity and reputation on migration issues still suffers due to the normative EU standards and discourse being difficult to translate into practical policy implementation. Hence, does the normative position of the EU and the traditional migration policy history in Greece create a dissonance in response to migration issues?

Although the presence of EU directives in Greek legislation indicate some coherency and consistency on the issue, Greece's nationalistic migration policy starkly contrasts the rights-based principles of the EU treaties and frameworks, indicating the existence of a policy dissonance. The next chapter section will identify the extent to which a disparity between policies exists and analyse the ramifications of this dissension in times of compounding financial and humanitarian crises.

### **Chapter 3: The Disparity Between Greece and the EU Policy Response to Compounding Crises**

Although European federal law binds and international conventions mutually binds contracted states, the European Union still grants;

*'discretion in that state law may derogate from European and international standards for the traditional public law objections regarding public order, public health and national security, as long as it does not include any unfair or disproportional discriminatory clauses.'* (Emmanouilidi, 2003)

This may create a troubling dissonance. Acknowledging the power vested in a state's capabilities to legislate policy on matters crucial to social cohesion are essential to the functionality of the Union. It reflects a complex equilibrium – the balance between the right of the state, the right of the individual and the right of the Union. The extent to which this balance can be maintained determines the level of social and political cohesiveness from a top-down approach; as the Union can balance and satisfy the political situations in Member States, so can states better balance and satisfy the needs of individuals, irregular or not. The policies that the EU interweaves into the Greek policymaking process should theoretically lead to greater cohesiveness between the EU and Greece.

In times of relative peace and stability, this dissonance can be forgiven as a merely administrative backlog, the forgoing of aligning national policies with broader EU values because no significant pressure forces the political agenda to do so. Pooling state sovereignty mutually binds states by European federal law; however, policy harmonisation requires facilitation by national legislators to enact policy for the citizens. Though the normative harmonisation of policy the EU *expects* of Member States could not predict Greece being the location of critical European crises; both economic and humanitarian in nature. The 2008 financial crisis and 2015 refugee crisis indicate a severe lack of a coherent and humanitarian response by both the EU and Greece. A large expectation was placed on Greece to not only legislate for the mass inflow of unregulated migrants, but to do so with extremely limited fiscal options. Greek migration policy did not represent the new reality of the state, the reality of transforming from transit state to a de facto final destination (Drymioti & Gerasopoulos, 2018).

### **Compounding Crises**

The Greek financial crisis in mid-2008, unbeknownst at the time, was a catalyst for the long-term downturn of Greek stability as a Member State within the EU. The financial crisis undoubtedly owes its origins to the Greek government and the continuation of a weak political system that spurred on consistent mismanagement of the domestic economy; the government debt increased at unprecedented levels when the public debt already exceeded 100% of the GDP (Kouretas & Vlami, 2010). This context is essential to understanding the Greek political system entering into the refugee crisis. According to the Eurobarometer 75 from 2011, Greece had the highest portion of respondents stating that EU membership was a 'bad thing', slightly ahead of the UK (European Commission, 2011). The context of the financial crisis is central to emerging trends of Euroscepticism in Greece and to understanding the humanitarian crisis that unfolds in 2015, as well as the process of de-Europeanising national policy away from the normative & idealistic vision of the EU. In the financial crisis, it was the perception that the EU's overbearing involvement in debtor's countries economic policy implied EU-initiated reforms were linked to a perceived loss of sovereignty and economic disorder perpetrated by the EU (Vasilopoulou, 2018).

In 2012, before the refugee crisis emerged, Conservative party spokesperson Maria Kollia Tsarousha argued in parliament for the need for Greece to legislate its own migration policy, claiming that not only were Western member states conveniently supportive of the Dublin Regulation (as they were not external states of the EU border), but also that the regulation 'has proven to be inefficient for the protection and promotion of our country's interest' (Triandafyllidou, 2014). In addition to this, the far-right party spokesperson for LAOS, Athanasios Plevris, pushed a discourse critical of the EU, politicising and dehumanising the plight of unregulated migrants, claiming that '400 million Africans, Asians, hard core Islamists want to invade Europe – which is the actual problem – each nation state in Europe seeks to transfer the problem to another', again taking aim at the Dublin regulations inefficiency (Triandafyllidou, 2014). A clear antagonism towards the efficacy and legitimacy of the EU in handling Greek problems existed, laying levels of blame on other EU states for not alleviating pressures Greece faced.

The anti-European trend was evident following Greece's bankruptcy, but in 2015 the refugee crisis exacerbated the state's vulnerability and (as recognised by parliament) the lack of coherent policy on dealing with mass migration. As a result of political instability, war and minimal economic opportunity in Syria, North Africa and the Middle East, millions of unregulated migrants attempted to seek asylum in Europe by crossing through the Mediterranean Sea from Turkey and into Greece. The EU external border was placed under immense pressure as a first point of contact, with approximately one million people crossing into Greece between 2015 and 2016 (UNHCR Press, 2016).

During the six-year period between the financial crisis and the beginning of the refugee crisis, Greece's state capacity to effectively answer challenges to the social, political and economic infrastructure and human resources have been, and continue today to be exhausted by compounding humanitarian crises (Stergiou, 2016). According to the Dublin Regulation, the processing and examining the claims of the large influx of unregulated migrants onto Greek Islands and ports remains solely the responsibility of the Greek state. Greek migration policy was unready for such a monumental burden. The financial crisis undoubtedly made implementing the Dublin Regulation difficult and even harder to adhere to consistently. It worsened the state's bureaucratic capacity to deal with another crisis and was compounded by Greece's limited administrative experience in legislating effective migration policy. The government introduced four policy shifts aimed at removing bottlenecks obstructing asylum seekers from beginning the application process; yet this effort resulted in low asylum application rates due to making it more difficult for the government to distinguish between refugees (they must protect) and other forms of unregulated migrants (who can legally be deported) (Carlson et al., 2018). As a result, the asylum process significantly slowed and created a backlog of applicants who were stuck in policy-induced limbo and forced to wait for the Greek bureaucratic capacity 'catch-up' and process applications.



Due to this backlog and increasing number of unregulated migrants forced to wait in camps for their application to be processed, the living conditions on detention camps rapidly deteriorated. The implementation of EU policy by Greek officials stagnated and fellow EU governments heavily criticised Greece's role in containing the crisis. Wolfgang Schauble, the current President of the German Bundestag, and the German finance minister in 2015, stated that Greece has ignored the EU rules that oblige migrants to file for asylum in the country they first arrive in, and added 'the Greeks should not put the blame for their problems only on others' (Reuters, 2015). This statement came in response to Athenian officials claiming fellow Member States were not doing enough to help alleviate the pressure of the crisis. International organisation has also heavily criticised Greece for its handling of the crisis. The UNHCR reported that 'medical assistance, water, food shelter, and information... are exhausted' and that such a level of suffering 'should and can be' avoided in accordance with international law (UNHCR Press, 2015).

This back-and-forth political rhetoric is detrimental to the functionality of the EU. Identifying the crisis as Greece's problem creates a dissonance between the EU and Greece that fundamentally allows for Greece to legislate for its 'own' problem, rather than follow the neo-liberal model the EU promotes. Criticisms levelled at Greece claim two violations: fundamental human rights violations and a lack of responsibility in upholding their EU obligation. The violation of human rights in detention camps directly negates the articles outlined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The international norms surrounding the fundamental rights obligations places pressure on adapting to the required (higher) EU standard (Papageorgiou, 2013). Yet, the EU standard creates a permissible narrative of Greek incompetence, perpetrated by discontented states who are receiving unregulated migrants escaping past EU external borders. Greece was, unfairly or not, the perfect scapegoat for the crises that embroiled Europe.

### **EU-Greek Dissonance**

It is not coincidence that this tumultuous period coincides with a rise in anti-immigration sentiments domestically in Greece. The Golden Dawn, a neo-Nazi, xenophobic political party gained electoral momentum during the financial crisis scoring 7% (21 seats out of 300) during the 2012 parliamentary elections. It again replicated these scores in the January and September 2015 parliamentary elections, scoring 6.3% and 7% respectively (Sekeris & Vasilakis, 2016). A key part of the Golden Dawn doctrine is an anti-EU and anti-European stance. This resonated heavily with municipalities that experienced the heaviest influx of unregulated migrants, which led to an increase in the share of votes for the Golden Dawn in the September 2015 elections respectively (Sekeris & Vasilakis, 2016). As the crisis continued to unfold, European influences on Greek policy still remained. Yet, Europeanisation was opposed at numerous times by political parties in parliamentary addresses. Although parties such as the centre-right New Democracy and radical left SYRIZA are pro-EU, tensions stemming from the financial crisis placed a great strain on the trust in Europe, creating high

levels of Euroscepticism to the effectiveness of European integration. The Golden Dawn's far-right ideology is intrinsically incompatible with the EU political project and the facilitation of its rise in the time of crisis by promoting an anti-immigration creed is of great concern to the EU and represents an opportunity for political parties to wield EU instability as a tool of politicisation.

However, Euroscepticism is not a trait of the far-right alone. Alexis Tsipras, the former Greek Prime Minister who led SYRIZA during the 2015 crisis, utilised damning political rhetoric that isolates the emerging dissonance between Greece and the EU. During his election campaign, Tsipras stated that;

*'When the Mediterranean turns into a watery grave, the very concept of a united Europe is in crisis, as is European culture... (if Europe) leaves each member state to its own devices in a major crisis, this is not a Europe of its founders, and nor can it have a future'* (Nestoras, 2015)

As evident with the rise of electoral popularity of the far-right Golden Dawn, the far-left populist position of Tsipras also condemned the false pretence of European unity in times of crisis. Tsipras' own policies were geared towards radical politicking against capitalism and neo-liberal globalisation which SYRIZA portrayed as an ideological crisis, built on the belief that crisis is a European issue and not a solely a Greek one (Nestoras, 2015). Although the politicisation of the crisis in the Greek political system represented a critical ideological shift, it exacerbates the need for a common or coherent policy response by both the EU and Greece as well as a gaping disparity between policy aims and practical implementation. Accusations from multiple Greek parties across the left-right political spectrum have been levelled against the EU, claiming the Union to be an ultra-capitalist entity only focussed on securing fiscal alliances amongst the Europe's richest individuals and states. This was a strong discourse amongst the radical Greek Communist party, the KKE, which portrayed the EU as an imperialist power that intervenes in domestic affairs and establishes protectorate states that can be controlled (Vasilopoulou, 2018). Whether these political allegations bear any truth is in fact of little consequence; the important element is the politicisation of the financial and refugee crisis to undermine EU credibility in Greece. The far-left and far-right attempted to sway public opinion against the solidarity and effectiveness of the EU by emphasising the absence of EU reliability in amassing solidarity amongst member states.

### **EU-Turkey Deal & Rising Tensions in 2020**

In 2016, the EU struck an unprecedented bargain with Turkey to stem the flow of unregulated migrants into Greece/EU external border. The EU-Turkey Statement to end irregular flows of migration into the EU was a critical policy shift in response to the crisis in Greece. Under the 2016 deal, Turkey would accept the future return of unregulated migrants making their way to Greece, based on the EU designating Turkey as a safe third country for legal return of migrants. The migrants in Turkey would then, once the numbers in the Mediterranean

subsidised, be voluntarily resettled into EU member states. In return, the EU would speed-up the visa liberalisation and EU accession process with Turkey in addition to 3 billion Euros of financial relief granted by the EU (Weber, 2017).

This deal can only be considered a success relative to the oppressive nature of the outcome. The number of unregulated migrants entering Greece did drop; data indicates that between March 20<sup>th</sup> and April 19<sup>th</sup>, a 30% decrease in total arrivals was recorded on the main Balkan (Eastern) route between Turkey and Greece but coincided with a parallel rise in (more treacherous) Central route (Di Bartolomeo, 2016). The deal drew, however, drew harsh criticism from international organisations such as Amnesty International and the UN. The head of Amnesty International condemned the deal stating;

*'the idea of bartering refugees for refugees is not only dangerously dehumanising, but also offers no long-term solution for the ongoing humanitarian crisis... trading away the rights and dignities of some of the world's most vulnerable people'.* (Amnesty, 2016)

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi in a statement to the European Parliament conveying his deep concern over 'any arrangement that would involve the blanket return of anyone from one country to another without spelling out the refugee protection safeguards under international law' (Reuters, 2016). Unsurprisingly, the criticism levelled against the deal would reflect the soon-to-be reality.

Due to another steady increase of unregulated migrants at the end of 2019, the Turkish government in February 2020 announced it would renege on the EU-Turkey deal and allow for migrants to travel onwards to Greece and further into the EU, effectively ending the deal. With the number of vulnerable migrants arriving in Greece, the EU levelled blame against Turkey for not upholding their end of the bargain. The Turkish government's decision allowed for a swift increase in unregulated migrants attempts to cross onto the Greek Islands is compounding the already existing humanitarian crisis in the infamous detention camps on Lesbos and Moria. This resulted in an already dire situation spilling over into violence, threats and intimidation against refugees and volunteers (Jones et al., 2020). The EU-Turkey Deal only provided a short period of relief, and with Turkey's own political and security agenda being a clear contradiction of the interests of the EU, the three year period during which this deal was in place served to do nothing but patch over the shortcomings of the EU's ability to find a humane solution to the crisis.

In response to the EU's inability to find a solution, Greece has continued to legislate and implement policies that further alienate the European political influence. On January 1st, 2020 the New Democracy government's latest reform of asylum policy 4636/2019 came into effect extending the time an asylum seeker can be held in detention. Under article 46 of 4636/2019, people applying for international protection can be detained, if necessary,

regardless of whether they apply for asylum while in detention or not (OHCHR, 2019). Again, international organisation has condemned the new policy as a violation of fundamental human rights. The executive director of Amnesty International in Greece Gabriel Sakellaridis condemned the policy as a 'clear violation of international standards, under which detention should not be the rule' (POLITICO, 2019). In response to such a criticism, the Minister for Citizen Protection in Greece Michalis Chrysochoidis stated that 'the new rules are simply a precise adoption and implementation of the European asylum directive and the Union's asylum legislation' (POLITICO, 2019). Thus, the issues faced in the 2015 crisis failed to formulate a coherent policy approach to find a solution, hence perpetrating the continuation of policy dissonance between Greece's treatment of unregulated migrants and the standards and norms of various international conventions and of the EU.

#### **Chapter 4: Implications, Recommendations & Conclusion**

A multitude of critical repercussions have emerged from analysing the deepening policy dissonance between Greek and the EU. The Union has faced severe backlash of the handling of both the financial and humanitarian crises in Greece. But why? A popular criticism is the neo-liberal deterioration of national state sovereignty. As established, a key function of the Union is pursuing a policy of mutual benefit, by respecting state sovereignty and the sovereign's ability to self-legislate national policy, especially in the domains of security, public health, infrastructure and foreign policy.

Policy dissonance emerges as a product of this dichotomy in the functionality of the EU, with no clear mechanisms to alleviate it. The equilibrium of compatible state and human rights is out of balance insofar that human lives suffer at the expense of securing a state's right to self-determination. The EU, as a neo-liberal political project, starkly contrasts with individual state's own political outlook, which is again differentiated from fundamental, *individual* human and civil rights. These tensions are greatly aggravated in times of crisis. Perhaps more bluntly, each state, individual citizen and even the entirety of the EU is bestowed with fundamental rights which theoretically should be compatible with the rights of all others; as is the heart of international human rights and the globalisation of fundamental rights. Yet, a crisis that hinges of saving individual lives brings these rights into direct conflict. What respectable policy can the EU implement that places the same ethical value of life on an unregulated migrant as it does on the right of Greece to legislate for the safety of the Greek citizen? Simultaneously, what policy can be implemented that respects the right of Greece as a nation state to legislate for the right of its citizens, even if those rights supersede the human rights of an unregulated migrant? It appears incompatible.

The EU faces a clear liberty dilemma. How can it reconcile a commitment to the states right to democratic self-determination with individual freedom and universal equality? (Mendoza,

2016). The EU treaties accentuate the self-determination properties it wishes to see in member states. Yet, at least at the policy level, in the case of Greece's handling of the refugee crisis, self-determination (in the form of self-legislating policy) violates fundamental individual freedom and universal equality. As conditions in detention camps worsen, this disparity widens. The EU *must* respect Greece as a self-determining state with control over its security and public needs. This is the basic underpinning driving the functionality of the Union. Yet, it must also respect the dignity and equality of *all* human beings regardless of the colour of their skin, religious beliefs or even sexuality or gender orientation. The EU must concurrently promote their members' right to self-determination while ensuring individual human rights are not violated. This is a difficult task. Respecting both positions is akin to picking the lesser evil: Union solidarity on member state problems, or Union solidarity in protecting fundamental human rights. EU treaties and policies in words only support this (the commitment to both state self-determination and human rights) but in the realm of practical policy implementation and adherence this gap is too large; this allows countries to wield their sovereignty and democratic right to self-determination as a front to comprehensively addressing crises that costs human lives. The Union critical must discover a means to alleviating this duality of EU commitments – balancing the right of states while also maintaining a steadfast loyalty to upholding fundamental human rights.

Greece's migration policy never aligned with the normative ideals of the EU. Is it unfair for the Union and member states to criticise Greece's poor response to the humanitarian crisis, while simultaneously not building, or enacting a comprehensive solution to issues pertaining to migration? Perhaps, although blame can be equally dispersed. The EU cannot continue to legislate for the present but must do so for the future of the survival of the union. It is no coincidence that radical politics in Greece wield EU incompetence as a tool of de-Europeanising state ideology. The humanitarian crises provide valuable fodder for such rhetoric. By isolating EU deficiencies in aiding the relief effort, the Greek political system can emphasise the lack of proficiency demonstrated by the EU. All the while the crisis that has stolen human lives is central to pushing an anti-EU agenda. The longer the EU cannot stem the flow of unregulated migrants dying attempting a dangerous crossing or living in conditions detrimental to sustaining human dignity and survival, the greater chance of further dissent amongst EU member states.

The politicisation of the crisis to pursue agendas in parliament is as immoral as it is illiberal. In the case of Greece, radical political parties use crises to push forward an agenda for the party. Similarly, the far-right Jobbik party in Hungary and the Northern League in Italy promote an agenda similar to the Golden Dawn: xenophobia, extreme nationalism, racism, and the hatred of immigrants – all of which amalgamate into negative consequences for Western European society and the longevity and legitimacy of the EU (Ratkovic, 2017). Additionally, states such as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have commonly put national interests ahead of adhering to the common principles, directives and binding

policies of the EU (Ratkovic, 2017). The rapid rise of European immigration is granting radical political parties the platform to gain power and propose de-Europeanising and Eurosceptic agendas that may come to challenge the very normative foundation of the EU, its institutions, governing bodies and fellow members (Davis & Deole, 2017).

How can this be remedied? It will be an extremely daunting task for both the EU and the contemporary liberal order. Firstly, the EU is in dire need of a comprehensive policy approach to migration. The CEAS has proven inefficient at handling migration issues in the EU as shown by the 2016 EU-Turkey Deal, a desperate attempt at a short-term solution for the problem that still exists today. If the CEAS is to remain in place it is in need of reform (the Dublin Regulation especially). It is a critical question of burden-sharing. The EU could adopt a broader policy position of global responsibility-sharing and play into the strengths of the international liberal order. By developing stronger partnerships at the bilateral, regional and global level the EU can promote a wider support network of burden-sharing responsibilities that strengthens the legitimacy of the liberal order, thus creating a stronger position for the EU to condemn states that do not follow binding regulations (Council of European Union, 2019). The European Council has recognised the need for a more inclusive system of incentives and leverage (Council of European Union, 2019). Member states are culturally unique and diverse. In order to achieve a coherent policy between EU and individual states, the Union needs to politically adapt to cultural aspects of a state's legal culture; in the case of Greece it is a poorly planned and implemented position on migration, which has since severely spiralled out of control. This includes identifying sensitive domestic push and pull factors relative to migration, as seen in Greece with attempting to reinforce the informal economy using cheap or illegal migrant labour. The EU can re-establish a strong legal presence by applying directives not as a broad mechanism for all EU members but tailored to the specific needs of individual states to maximise policy outcomes and solutions. This could also be achieved by tailoring an incentive & leverage package tailored to the unique needs of a state.

Another, perhaps more radical approach, is to legalise genuine EU-sanctioned migration paths for unregulated migrants into EU-built reception and processing centres. The aim of this policy is to eliminate illegal crossings across the Mediterranean and promote legal access into an EU processing centre. In doing so, the EU can enforce and uphold the migrants' fundamental rights and bypass state intervention which may act to the detriment of unregulated migrants. This would require a comprehensive framework built on mutual trust and recognition of shared interests; however, it would be an EU initiative built and implemented on nation state territory (Tiekstra & Zweers 2018). By opening a legal channel for unregulated migration, this could eliminate needless deaths attempting a more dangerous (and illegal) crossing route into Europe. Then, rather than have a state-led application process, an EU sanctioned naturalisation process would alleviate the state responsibility to provide essential goods and services to unregulated migrants that can stretch human resources and state capacity, again causing more unwanted harm to vulnerable persons. Once

processed and verified as a legitimate applicant for European naturalisation, unregulated migrants can be redirected to volunteer member states in a reformed burden-sharing scheme.

These recommendations require urgent attention. The further the EU fails to deal with crises comprehensively, the further loss of human life can be expected. If that was not already a driving factor, the crises also allow for radical political parties to promote anti-European and anti-EU rhetoric that strips away the European standard from national politics and policies. The European liberal order is under threat to collapse from a resurgence of nationalistic-based politics vindicating unregulated migrants to prioritise state interests over universal equality and individual rights. This dissonance at the policy and theoretical level must be addressed if the legitimacy of the EU is to continue. A coherent policy solution to unregulated migration and the humanitarian crises emerging could alleviate both the diminishing respect on human rights as well as anti-European political division within member states.

### Bibliography

- Amnesty, 2016. *EU Turkey Summit: EU And Turkish Leaders Deal Death Blow To The Right To Seek Asylum*. [online] Amnesty.org. Available at:  
<<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/03/eu-turkey-summit-reaction/>>
- Apostolatos K, 2006 IMISCOE - International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe, 2006. *Immigrant And Immigration Policy-Making: A Review Of The Literature Of The Greek Case*. IMISCOE Working Paper: Country Report. IMISCOE.
- Carlson, M., Jakli, L. and Linos, K., 2018. Rumors and Refugees: How Government-Created Information Vacuums Undermine Effective Crisis Management. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(3), pp.671-685.
- Davis, L., and S.S. Deole, "Immigration and the Rise of Far-Right Parties in Europe", *Ifo DICE report* 15 (2017): 10-15.
- Di Bartolomeo, A. EU Migration Crisis Actions with a focus on the EU-Turkey Agreement, *MPC Policy Brief*, April 2016.
- Drymiotis, Marilena, and Vassilis Gerasopoulos. "Entangling the Migration and the Economic 'Crisis': Claiming What's Rightfully Greek." *Etnofoor* 30, no. 2 (2018): 49-70.
- Gropas, R. and Triandafyllidou, A., 2005. Migration in Greece at a Glance. *Hellenic Foundation For European & Foreign Policy*, pp.1-13.

- Euronews, 2020. *Greece Is 'Europe's Shield' In Migrant Crisis: EU Chief Von Der Leyen*. [online] Euronews. Available at: <<https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/03/greece-migrant-crisis-is-an-attack-by-turkey-on-the-eu-austria>>
- Ioakimidis, P., 2000. The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment. *South European Society and Politics*, 5(2), pp.73-94.
- Jones, C., Kilpatrick, J., Pallares Pla, Y., Statewatch, 2020. *EU/Turkey/Greece: Crisis Not Averted: Security Policies Cannot Solve A Humanitarian Problem, Now Or In The Long-Term*. Statewatch Analysis. London: Statewatch.
- Kapsalis, A., 2018. The development of Greek migration policy and the invention of “paralegality” in labour relations of immigrants. *Κοινωνική Πολιτική*, 9, p.67.
- Kassimi, C. and Kasimis, C., 2004. *Greece: A History Of Migration*. [online] migrationpolicy.org. Available at: <<https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/greece-history-migration>>
- Kouretas, G. and Vlamis, P., 2010. The Greek crisis: Causes and implications. *Panoeconomicus*, 57(4), pp.391-404.
- Mavrodi, G. 2005. Europeanising National Immigration Policy: The Case of Greece. Working Paper 8/2005, Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development, University of Bielefeld, Bielefeld
- Mendoza, J., 2016. *The Moral And Political Philosophy Of Immigration: Liberty, Security, And Equality*. 1st ed. Maryland, USA: Lexington Books.
- Nestoras, A. Institute of European Democrats, 2015. *The Gatekeeper's Gambit: SYRIZA, Left Populism And The European Migration Crisis*. IED Working Paper. Brussels: IED.
- OHCHR, 2019. *OHCHR | Working Group On Arbitrary Detention: Preliminary Findings From Its Visit To Greece (2 - 13 December 2019)*. [online] Ohchr.org. Available at: <<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25421&LangID=E>>
- Papageorgiou, I., 2013. The Europeanization of Immigration and Asylum in Greece (1990-2012). *International Journal of Sociology*, 43(3), pp.72-90.



- POLITICO, 2019. *Greece To Move Asylum Seekers To Closed Camps*. [online] POLITICO. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-move-asylum-seekers-closed-pre-removal-detention-camps-aegean-islands-immigration-noria-lesbos/>
- POLITICO, 2019. *Greece Toughens Asylum Rules As Migrant Arrivals Rise*. [online] POLITICO. Available at: <https://www.politico.eu/article/greece-toughen-asylum-rules-as-migrant-arrivals-rise/>
- Ratkovic, M., 2017. Migrant crisis and strengthening of the right wing in the European Union. *Megatrend revija*, 14(3), pp.47-60.
- Reuters, 2015. *German Politicians Slam Greece Over Handling Of Refugee Crisis*. [online] Reuters. Available at: <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-germany/german-politicians-slam-greece-over-handling-of-refugee-crisis-idUSKBN0UA09620151227>>
- Reuters, 2016. *U.N., Rights Groups Say EU-Turkey Migrant Deal May Be Illegal*. [online] Reuters. Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants/u-n-rights-groups-say-eu-turkey-migrant-deal-may-be-illegal-idUSKCNOWA1D4>
- Robolis, S., 2016. Immigration in Greece: overview and perspectives. *Social Cohesion and Development*, 4(1), pp.27-44.
- Sekeris, Petros & Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis, 2016. "The Mediterranean Refugees Crisis and Extreme Right Parties: Evidence from Greece," *MPRA Paper 72222*, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stergiou, A., 2016. The Refugee Crisis And Its Effects On Greece's European Integration And Relations With Turkey. *Review of International Law & Politics*, 12(2), pp.75-99.
- Stavridis, S. (2003) The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy: a literature review, *LSE Hellenic Observatory Discussion Paper On Line* No. 10, September: available at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk>
- Tiekstra, W., Zweers, W. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2018. *Innovation In EU Migration Policy: Towards A Truly Comprehensive Approach To Migration*. Clingendael Report. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
- Triandafyllidou, A., The Royal Elcano Institute, 2008. *Controlling Migration In Greece: Policies, Problems And Opportunities*. Demography, Population & International Migrations. The Royal Elcano Institute.

Triandafyllidou, A., 2009. Greek Immigration Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century. Lack of Political Will or Purposeful Mismanagement?. *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 11(2), pp.159-177.

Triandafyllidou A., 2013, Hellenic Foundation For European and Foreign Policy, 2013. *Migration In Greece: People, Policies And Practices*. Athens, p.Hellenic Foundation For European and Foreign Policy.

Triandafyllidou, A., 2014. Greek Migration Policy in the 2010s: Europeanization Tensions at a Time of Crisis. *Journal of European Integration*, 36(4), pp.409-425.

UNHCR Press, 2015. *UNHCR Warns Of Deepening Refugee Crisis In Greece And Calls For Urgent And Bold Action*. [online] UNHCR. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/55c48ea69.html>

UNHCR Press, 2016. *More Than One Million Refugees Travel To Greece Since 2015*. [online] UNHCR. Available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/news/latest/2016/3/56e9821b6/million-refugees-travel-greece-since-2015.html>

Vasilopoulou, S., 2018. The party politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: The case of Greece. *Politics*, 38(3), pp.311-326.

Weber, B. (2017). The EU-Turkey refugee deal and the not quite closed Balkan route. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Dialogue Southeast Europe. June.

## **EU References**

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2012) *Official Journal C/326/02*

Council Directive 2005/85/EC 'on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status' (2005) *Official Journal* 326

Council of the European Union, 2019. *Way Forward For EU Migration And Asylum Policy - Outcome Of Discussions - Presidency Report*. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

European Commission, 2003. *"Greek Immigration And Asylum Policy" Analysis Of The Greek Institutional Framework Since The Beginning Of The 20Th Century*. Athens: European Commission.

European Commission & European Migration Network, 2012. *The Organisation Of Asylum And Migration Policies Factsheet: Greece*. [online] European Commission & European Migration Network. Available at: <[https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european\\_migration\\_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/asylum-migration/11.greece\\_factsheet\\_institutional\\_chart\\_october2012\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/asylum-migration/11.greece_factsheet_institutional_chart_october2012_en.pdf)>

European Commission, 2011. Standard Eurobarometer 75. Eurobarometer Surveys.

European Commission, 2014 A Common European Asylum System, access at: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/ceas-factsheets/ceas\\_factsheet\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/ceas-factsheets/ceas_factsheet_en.pdf)

European Commission, 2016. *Country Responsible For Asylum Application (Dublin) - Migration And Home Affairs*. [online] Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission. Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants_en)

European Commission, 2020. *Applying EU Law*. [online] European Commission. Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/applying-eu-law\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-process/applying-eu-law_en)

European Union, 2012. *The European Union Explained: How The European Union Works*. Brussels: European Union.

European Union, 2020. *Regulations, Directives And Other Acts | European Union*. [online] European Union. Available at: [https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en)

Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 2007. *Regularisation Programmes For Irregular Migrants*. Parliamentary Assembly Report. Strasbourg: The Council of Europe, p.12.

Treaty of the European Union (consolidated version) (2012) *Official Journal C326*